Ashok K Mehta
Earlier this month, Admiral Harry B Harris, Commander US Pacific Command, floated the idea of the Quadrilateral Dialogue and joint patrolling, both of which were promptly rejected because they would provoke China. New Delhi takes inordinate care not to step on Beijing’s toes, a sensitivity that Beijing does not reciprocate. In any case, it was unwise to publicly reject the proposals instead of maintaining diplomatic silence. As a net security provider in the region, New Delhi must not shy away from showing the flag while fast-tracking its operational capacities. India has intervened in national interest in 1950 in Nepal (it should have supported Tibet also), East Pakistan in 1971 and the Maldives and Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. It also assisted regimes in Seychelles, Mauritius and Fiji. It has flexed muscles directly or indirectly in the subcontinent and beyond. While still not averse to the use of force or coercive diplomacy of late, it has gone into a shell, erring on the side of caution, as in Afghanistan, but surprisingly overplaying its hand in Nepal.
Following a year of setbacks, the current scene in Afghanistan is disturbing. The US Department of Defence report (June 2015) either misjudged or more likely inflated the “ANSF capabilities capacities and morale to set the conditions for an Afghanistan-led and Afghanistan-owned reconciliation process”. The dramatic collapse of Konduz and the slow crumbling of Helmand Provinces coupled with the unprecedented attrition suffered by Afghan National Security Forces (7,000 killed) and civilian casualties (3,545 killed) in 2015 reflect serious gaps in their institutional structures, battlefield combat and logistics support, morale and higher leadership. Is this the 3,25,000 ANSF trained on high Nato standards that the US is planning to leave behind to prevent a divided 35,000 Taliban from posing an existential threat to the Kabul regime? US commanders have admitted to ANSF’s operational inadequacies because “some assumptions have not come true”, confirming President Barack Obama’s recent observation that “Afghan forces are not as strong as they need to be”. This is a US self-inflicted injury.
The Taliban war is about capturing geographical and political spaces, with the former proving easier. The seizure of 38 districts and contestation in 40 others is an all-time high of control of territory since 2001. A furious spring offensive is being advertised to spread panic and expand physical space, prompting a US National Security Council report into stating that any future US and Nato withdrawal will be predicated on the ground situation and not by any arbitrary time lines. President Obama will hand over the legacy of a good war of choice to his successor without meeting his ambitious and unrealistic target of winding it down through diplomatic means ie power-sharing arrangement between Kabul and the Taliban.
The year-long meticulously planned reconciliation roadmap by the Quadrilateral, US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, being stage-managed by Islamabad, remain grounded despite its de facto Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz claiming it had browbeaten Taliban to agree to talks. But according to Reuters Pakistan reporter Mehreen Zahra Malik, the Taliban have refused to come to the table, disobeying their godfather, the Pakistan military establishment, despite threats of having to vacate sanctuaries on Pakistani soil. The real story could be different. In view of the Taliban’s unexpected success on the battlefield, Islamabad, which is required to select 10 top representatives from the tier-one Taliban-members of Quetta and Peshawar shuras as opposed to lower rung tiers-two and three to bring to the table, has decided to raise the stakes. For the Taliban’s compliance (face-to-face talks and a power-sharing deal), Islamabad wants tentative assurance on the Durand Line and/or dilution of India’s role and presence in Afghanistan. Seeking concessions is not kite-flying but setting the stage for what has been called the Grand Bargain. The Taliban and its military backers are confident of sweeping gains capturing all of Helmand and Konduz provinces during the spring ground offensive, which will put them in a towering negotiating position. The Afghans have apparently set no pre-conditions for talks but related red lines to future outcomes. Talks could materialise in early winter once the Taliban has expanded territorial space and established battlefield dominance, but they are unlikely to prove positive.
The Americans, who do not want any strategic collapse of Kabul in the run-up to the presidential election, have put all their eggs in their frenemy, Pakistan’s basket. In a sense, so has Afghanistan. No one believes the reconciliation process can work: Already 75 per cent Afghans think it won’t. Is there a Plan B if the power-sharing talks hit a cul de sac? President Ashraf Ghani, CEO Abdullah Abdullah and National Security Advisor Haneef Atmar passionately believe in a regional approach without spelling out the contours of a regional mechanism to restrain Pakistan. The new Kabul-sponsored 6+1 Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, US and India, plus Afghanistan regional consultative mechanism to improve upon the Quadrilateral, may explore such a
structure.
The Karzai people led by former Ministers and advisors and contemporary think-tankers are frequenting New Delhi, urging India, the regional power, to shoulder its responsibility as the net security provider by implementing the defence cooperation component of the Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2011. Part of their plan is a qualitative upgrade of ANSF so that it can deter the Taliban and thwart the Pakistani dream. They say a wish list of military hardware was given to New Delhi in 2013, but little has materialised. In 2014, Kabul proposed to New Delhi a defence pact which was transferred to a secret locker in the PMO. In December 2015, at the Heart of Asia conference in Islamabad, Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj is reported to have said: “India would help in strengthening Afghan defence capability.” It was a bold declaration, indicating that New Delhi is not only not self-constricted but also not constrained by a Western and US veto apparently given to Islamabad on security-related activity in Afghanistan by India.
