B S Prakash
The conflict in Ukraine has deepened the distrust between Russia and the west and irrespective of the denouement, increases the challenges to NATO. Terror body Islamic State and the continuing disorder in West Asia will affect the rest of US Barack Obama’s luckless US presidency.
Ebola scares regions which thought that they had transcended such primeval threats and brings home the awareness that dangers are never truly remote. These factors also demonstrate the limitations of European power and its essentially adjunct status to the capacity of the US.
In all this, is China the one country that may have become stronger? Such voices are heard lately.
Admittedly, for India too, there are currently reasons for optimism but these arise more from a purposive leadership than the international dynamics. Besides, in a discussion of the global equations, it is appropriate to see India at this stage as a swing state and not a principal player.
Before we go further, is it relevant to talk of the rise or decline of great powers in the 21st century? Such talk characterised discussions on international relations in the last century.
Concepts of bi-polar rivalry, deterrence, and balance of power were the standard phrases in the strategic discourse. With US and Russia as adversaries, it was normal to think of a zero sum game, when the accretion of strength of one was seen as the loss of influence of the other.
To day, there are different ways of looking at power equations. The world is routinely described as multi-polar, with multiple power centres, some established, others emerging.
Hard-headed realists, however, see multi-polarity as nebulous and at best, as yet incipient, and regard the US and China as the two pre-eminent powers, while recognising the US as dominant at least for another two decades.
They focus on their rivalry or adversary qualities.
Others with less conviction contend that it is more apt to speak of the relative decline of the US and the rise, relative again, of other powers, principally China, and also other BRIC nations.
They stress the interdependence of major powers, for instance, that the growth of the Chinese economy is dependent on the demand in the US market, that the reserves of China are held in US banks etc and that therefore talk of the zero sum game as misleading.
In this framework and keeping in view the developments over the last six months, how does US and China fare?
The idea about the relative decline of the US is justified by its domestic dysfunctionality and frustrating external engagements. Its system is bedevilled by structural problems, above all, its incapacity to come to difficult decisions because of hostile partisan politics.
The two political parties, Democrats and Republicans, find it difficult to agree on basic national issues, be it taxes, balancing the budget, health, or immigration.
The antagonism between the Presidency and a hardcore Republican Congress may lead to further policy paralysis not only for the next two years, but possibly even longer.
The US is thus a hobbled power, despite its recent economic upsurge, unmatched technological prowess and excellence in innovation and creativity.
The frustrating external engagements are another dimension. Obama was never an eager warrior, started as a reluctant intervener, and was keen on ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But objective circumstances make it difficult for the US to walk away from situations wherein its past involvement makes it a key stake holder. The US may share a responsibility for the conflicts in West Asia and the rise of extremism, but its battle against IS will be long, costly and distracting.
American exceptionalism
Why does the US invariably and inevitably get drawn in conflicts far from its shores? US leaders believe in the notion of American exceptionalism and it being an ‘indispensable’ global power.
Objectively too, it is still true that in most conflict situations in the world, the US does see an interest and its power make a difference.
Right or wrong, there are no exits for the US in the foreseeable future from the theatres of conflict where it is currently engaged in one way or the other: Afghanistan, Iraq-Syria and the broader West Asia and Ukraine.
How about China? Its economic growth continues to be impressive and it is estimated that its GDP will outpace that of the US in a decade.
It will have its domestic challenges including containing dissent, managing rising aspirations of hundreds of millions, curbing corruption, battling environmental decay and others. But an authoritarian government with a hierarchy is able to implement its plans and designs.
On the external front, China has tensions with a number of its neighbours, but it may have the luxury of not being militarily engaged in situations where its vital interests are not involved.
Other factors in the international situation have conferred some advantages. A Russia under sanctions has entered into massive energy deals with China. It also benefits by lower petroleum and commodity prices.
Slowly, but steadily it is advancing its agenda of further consolidating its position in Asia by initiatives like the new Silk Route, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and newer platforms to draw in other Asian nations in its embrace.
China will be loath to talk of its rise, even peaceful rise, in the context of US decline.
Nevertheless, granting the complexities of the emerging world disorder, there is enough to show that China seems to be the net gainer in a tumultuous period.
