Taking responsibility for SAARC

Mayuri Mukherjee
The big question at the 18th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is this: Will India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, finally step up and take leadership responsibility for the forum? For the eight member grouping that includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, this is an existential question. For Prime Minister Modi, who has sought to establish a strong foreign credential in his first six months in office, this will be his biggest, diplomatic test – and he knows it.
The South Asian forum which turns 30 next year has largely been a disappointment, if not an entirely failed project. Look at it any which way you want but there is no denying that SAARC has been unable to deliver on two of its basic promises: Prevent war between its member states and encourage greater economic cooperation among them. Some of this failure is the result of geography – except for Afghanistan and Pakistan which share a border with each other, all the others only share a border with India, thereby making SAARC a rather India-centric project; some of the others causes can be attributed to history – while under the British Raj, the region functioned as a cohesive trading unit, it split up into rather inward-looking nations that were wary of free enterprise, and defined by bitterly contested borders, in the post-colonial period.
The difficult bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan, inarguably one of the biggest roadblocks for SAARC, is a product of both history and geography. Moreover, as recent reports about Pakistan playing spoilsport in signing the important rail transport network treaty shows, this is a problem that is not going away anytime soon. Having said that, however, it is also important to underline that Pakistan is not the only one responsible for the sad state of affairs at SAARC. India, its Pakistan problems notwithstanding, has also failed to in its role as the group’s natural leader.
In the early years of SAARC, India routinely gave preference to developing its relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis, rather than strengthening the multilateral forum. It was only after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s that New Delhi’s approach began to change. As the country grew stronger, and indeed more confident of itself, it also became more willing to assert itself on regional and international forums.
Very quickly, India went from a country that wanted no part of any pie (think Non-Aligned Movement) to demanding a finger in every pie. As India’s international profile grew stronger, and SAARC continued to wither away, many wondered if this country had outgrown its neighbourhood.  Having been found access to the global high table, was India now disinterested in its home turf?
The narrative changed again with Prime Minister IK Gujral’s foreign policy doctrine which said that India’s welfare was intrinsically linked to the fortunes of its neighbours, and focussed New Delhi’s efforts on South Asia. Successive Governments led by Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, carried forward this policy – at least in spirit, even if implementation was often patchy.
Now, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also reiterated the neighbours-come-first policy. And it is hoped that, unlike his predecessor, he will be able to convert policy formulations into practicable solutions. His invitation to all the SAARC leaders for this inauguration ceremony earlier this year, reminiscent of an emperor’s coronation where the kings come calling, was, a diplomatic masterstroke. Not only was it befitting the landmark mandate that he had been given but, more importantly in this context, it was a powerful signal to the rest of the neighbourhood that India, under Prime Minister Modi, will no longer shy away from its leadership responsibilities in South Asia. But strong signals apart, what about the substance? After all, even with the best of intentions, Modi can’t turn things around single-handedly.
For one, there are certain issues, like Pakistan, that lie beyond his control. Given the current situation in Pakistan, there is no space for a peace deal on matters related to Kashmir and other boundary disputes. Also, on the issue of terrorism, there is little that India can do, except for strengthening its fences, if Pakistani deliberately rears snakes at home, hoping to let them loose them this country. Outside of the Pakistan problem, India also has little control on political developments in other countries (for example, coups and rigged elections) which tend to fuel instability in the region. Sure, India can, and should, play a supportive role (as it did in Nepal with reconciliation of the Maoists) but it cannot force wholesale political changes (like keeping Islamists out of power).
But while the challenges facing Mr Modi in the region are myriad, there is also ample scope for him to bring about changes that can impact and improve the lives of more than a billion citizens.  A good place to start with the SAARC reform process is at home. Economically, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world -intra-regional trade is abysmally low at just five per cent of the total official trade; intra-regional investments are equally paltry. And India, by far the biggest economic entity in the region, is also embarrassingly the least open to intra-regional trade.
Talk of reversing this situation has been going on for quite a few years now. For example, in 2007, when India was leading the Saarc summit, President Pranab Mukherjee, then serving as External Affairs Minister under the UPA regime, had said at a conference of SAARC parliamentarians that this country, as the largest nation in the region, was willing to “to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, including opening up her markets to her South Asian neighbours without insisting on reciprocity.” Unfortunately, there was little change on the ground.
Economic cooperation apart, Modi could also look at enhancing collaboration in some of the other areas where joint challenges exist. For example, climate change is a major concern for all members particularly the Maldives. Similarly, energy security is a pressing matter for all South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan to some extent.

editorial articleMayuri MukherjeeTaking responsibility
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