Iqra Nissar
In the complex arena of global geopolitics, India is making a subtle and calibrated shift in its foreign policy. This move is primarily motivated by escalating tensions in trade relationship with America, a partnership once celebrated as the defining alliance of the 21st century. While Washington becomes more protectionist, New Delhi is not only expressing its concerns but it is also proactively seeking out alternative multilateral forums, as observed recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, to diversify its economic relations and demonstrate its strategic autonomy. This strategic shift is not easy, however, considering it’s undercurrents with some of its members. This maneuvering highlights India’s challenge-maintaining a crucial partnership with the West while fostering relationships in Eurasia to safeguard its economic and strategic interests.
From Strategic Partners to Trade Adversaries
The United States-India relationship during the post-Cold War period has been built on a convergence of strategic interests, including counterbalancing China, fighting terrorism, and promoting democratic stability in Asia. This partnership has matured into a strong economic relationship, with two-way trade in goods and services of over $130 billion. But underpinning this large number is an old problem of friction over trade behavior that has been aggravated by the “America First” agenda of the Trump. At its heart is a policy difference at the very foundation. The US has repeatedly raised objections to India’s use of tariffs and its alleged unfair trade activity. The main issues are Digital protectionism and America First Reciprocity.
American technology companies have raised concerns about India’s data localization requirements, which force companies to shift all of their data within Indian borders, and its apparent bias towards domestic industries in respect to digital payments systems. The US has been protesting India’s exceptionally high tariffs on many categories of US imports from electronics to medical devices to agro-products like almonds, apples and milk. Most importantly, these demands for reciprocity are seen as threatening India’s development goals. India sees these measures of protection as a developmental objective to support its infant industries, and, to guard the security of its vast agrarian economy and the data security of its people.
The American pressure is seen as an effort to impose open markets for its dominant firms to the detriment of India’s economic progress and strategic independence. This deadlock has pushed India’s strategic minds to seek options outside Washington. Uncertainty of the U.S. trade relationship has added new urgency to the necessity of diversified supply chains, markets for exports other than the United States, and allies who don’t condition relationships on adjusting to a Western-driven economic model.
The Complex Reality of SCO and BRICS: Platforms of Convenience, Not Ideology In seeking alternative alliances, India has intentionally turned to the east and north, actively interacting with the China-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Russia-backed BRICS group.
These are not blocs of like-minded friends but fields of complex and at times competing interests, and India must navigate them cautiously. The recent SCO Summit at Tianjin, China, and the present US-India trade tensions serve to highlight the intricacies spelt out in the relationship. These forums, while presenting alternative alignments, are riddled with cross-cutting interests, which require skilled manoeuvring by New Delhi to protect its sovereignty as well as economic interests. The 2025 SCO Summit was a watershed for India in that it showed a warming of India-China relations amid the two countries’ past border conflicts.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi led to agreements to resume direct flights, re-open trade routes, and strengthen bilateral relations-moves that could boost economic cooperation in the face of strained Western ties. Major deliverables were the Tianjin Declaration, which denounced the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, consistent with India’s anti-terrorism policy, and the creation of an SCO Anti-Drug Center and Development Bank. These projects encourage regional security and infrastructure financing, which can be of benefit to India’s connectivity aspirations.
Nevertheless, the China-dominated SCO framework and membership of Pakistan create complications; New Delhi has to balance Beijing’s power while challenging Islamabad’s role in cross-border terrorism.
Modi’s priority on having a “special and privileged” relationship with Russia at the summit also depicts India’s balancing act, utilizing Moscow’s influence as a counter to US pressures. This circumspect involvement is reflective of the fact that SCO is not an allies’ bloc but a platform of complex interests, in which India pursues its agenda against extremism and separatism without complete convergence. The USIndia trade war has amplified this tilt and taking it to the level of a diplomatic crisis,Trump’s duties of 50% on Indian exports affected up to seventy percent of shipments alongwith 25% retaliatory duty on India’s purchase of Russian oil. This is part of a broader US effort to counter China and to punish countries like India for not decoupling entirely with Russia during the Ukraine war. There has been recent de-escalation, as Trump and Modi resumed trade talks, but the invitation to G7 allies to impose tariffs on India suggests volatility remains.
This kind of action drives India toward SCO and BRICS for economic strength. Within BRICS, which welcomed Indonesia as a member in 2025, India calls for solving trade deficits and reform of global governance with a focus on climate financing, governance of AI, and multilateral reforms, all consistent with India’s leadership of the Global South. This mirrors India’s balancing act between Eastern multipolarity and Western alliances. In the end, with the SCO’s multipolar thrust and US trade belligerence, India’s diplomacy exemplifies realistic prudence. By participating in these platforms, New Delhi diversifies alliances, combats isolationism, and promotes national interests such as security and development. Success, though, depends on dampening risks from paramount players like China and Russia to ensure these fields benefit, not detract from, India’s global profile. This navigation is crucial in a fragmented world order, where alternative alliances offer opportunities but demand vigilance.
The Way Forward
India’s future foreign policy trajectory is not about choosing between the United States and the Russia China axis. Rather, it will be defined by a sophisticated and long-term strategy of multi-alignment-interacting with all parties to optimize its national interest. India will continue to deepen its security partnership with the United States and its Quad allies (Australia and Japan) as a crucial counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, it will hold on to its defence relations with Russia, an important provider of military equipment, and continue to engage with the SCO to keep itself firmly seated at the
Eurasian table. This requires embracing inherent contradictions, e.g., buying Russian oil in defiance of US objections, and justifying it as a necessary step to manage domestic inflation. India’s renewed interest in SCO and BRICS is a pragmatic move in the face of this changed reality. It is a calculated gamble that it can navigate the rivalries within these groups to secure its own interests, all while keeping its options open with the West. Ultimately, India’s long-term vision is to develop its own indigenous economic and technological capacities to the extent that it is an indispensable global power in its own right and not just a swing state.
