Rajan Gandhi
Recent tremors on Iran- Iraq border which caused quite a devastation and killed more than 400 people has once again shifted focus on our state which is a multi-hazard State falling in Seismic Zone-IV and Zone-V, with low lying areas of Kashmir and parts of Jammu being flood prone and upper catchments of all the tributaries of the Jhelum, Indus, Chenab and Tawi rivers are prone to flash floods as well as areas in high reaches including Leh and Kargil are prone to avalanches and the hilly areas to cloudburst; areas alongside highways are prone to landslides and most parts of Jammu are prone to drought. In the last two decades, the State has witnessed several disasters such as February 2005 snow blizzard at Waltengu Nad (Kulgam District) with 175 deaths and 128 families affected ,October 2005 earthquake at Baramulla and Poonch 953 deaths and 418 injured, September 2009 drought (Kharif) 18 districts affected, August 2010 cloudburst at Leh 257 deaths and 424 injured September 2014 floods in Kashmir and Jammu 304 deaths and 24 seriously injured and interestingly relief work was undertaken without declaration of these as disasters as per SDMP (State Disaster Management Plan).
Tragic part is that we have not learnt any lessons from the past. Nationally, the Disaster Management Act was enacted in 2005 but as usual our State Disaster management Authority (SDMA), was established in April 2007 only, had met only once in 2012 in the last six years as per CAG audit. Performance Audit of State Disaster Management has been conducted by CAG which pointed out serious lapses. CAG observed that the State Advisory Committee (SAC) responsible for making recommendations on issues relating to disaster management had not been constituted. Similarly no Disaster Management Authority had been constituted at the divisional level while Disaster Management Authorities constituted at the district level are almost non-functional. All this has resulted in inadequate disaster preparedness. The gratuitous relief which has to be provided within 15 days from the occurrence of a natural calamity was being delayed up to more than six months which defeated the very purpose of providing immediate relief. Government had not even conducted assessment of hazards, vulnerabilities and risks in the State and there are no risk maps for 13 multi-hazard districts despite Rs 20 lakh having been released by Government of India in June 2014 under the Capacity Building grants for this purpose.
CAG report clearly pointed out the lapses in regaining-restoring wetland, water bodies, flood channels. In the floods of September 2014, Srinagar and adjoining districts were the most affected areas. The heavy rainfall resulted in huge water discharge in the Jhelum river exceeding the carrying capacity of the river and its flood channels. This combined with blocked flood channels and inadequate flood control measures triggered floods with devastating effect. As per CAG report, the flood spill channels with original carrying capacity of 17,000 cusecs of water had been reduced to a carrying capacity of 4,000 cusecs of water due to accumulation of sediment from various nallahs which merge with the channel at various points. Though Scheme for Improvements to Flood Spill channel by way of construction of central cunnette was taken up in 2008-09, but it was subsequently subsumed in the “Flood Threat to River Jhelum Scheme” (2010-11) at a cost of approximately Rs 50.68 crores. Under the first scheme only about 81 per cent and under the second scheme only 68 per cent of the total targeted flood spill channels were treated. The Flood Spill Channel Division Narbal shifted the work to Wullar lake on the direction of the administrative department. Neither any approval was obtained from GoI for diversion of the funds nor was No Objection Certificate (NOC) required from wetland authorities for execution of construction works in wetland areas falling under the area of implementation of the scheme taken. Consequently, construction of drainage channel covering 1,641 meters could not be completed due to objection raised against the construction by the wetland authorities. As a result, requisite earth could not be excavated from the wetland area and the wetland continued to remain filled with silt despite availability of funds. CAG clearly pointed out that had the two schemes been progressed and implemented as per their Detailed Project Reports, the impact of the floods of September 2014 would have been mitigated. Have the culprit officials been made accountable?
CAG further observed that the State Government established the State Disaster Response Force (SDRF) in February 2012 out of existing two battalions of Auxiliary Police. The mandate of the Force was deployment in disaster-like situations, search/ rescue operation in actual disasters and assistance to civil administration in relief and rehabilitation process. But no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) had been prescribed for deployment of Force personnel. Against a sanctioned strength only 31 per cent were actually deployed in its units. The balance 69 per cent of its personnel were utilized for purposes such as parade/quarter guard duties, attachment with Home Guard/Civil Defence units, various offices ,attached to political leaders and serving/retired police officers as PSOs/orderlies and with trade duties. Though it is mandatory for disaster force personnel to undergo a basic re-orientation course followed by specialized courses, practically only 399 personnel were imparted training on orientation course, 465 personnel were imparted training on disaster management courses and 237 on specialized courses during 2010-11 to 2014-15. CAG clearly pointed out that the bulk of the available manpower is neither fully trained nor deployable for disaster relief and rehabilitation and specialists such as engineers, technicians, dog squads and medical/ paramedics are not available with this force thereby defeating the objective of creation of the Force. After CAG report though work force has been recalled to parental units and trainings are going on.
CAG report also pointed out that earthquake resistant seismic designs have not been made mandatory for private buildings and disaster resistant designs and retrofitting techniques were not ensured in re-construction of houses damaged during the floods of September 2014. Hence, the constructions remained vulnerable to earthquakes despite being in a seismic sensitive zone. The SDMP envisages that a mechanism should be in place to receive forecasting and early warning from agencies such as the Indian Meteorological Department and the Snow and Avalanches Study Establishment. Modern equipment such as Doppler Radars and satellite based information has to be basis of accurate forecasting, advance warning and alerts for floods, cloudbursts, snowstorms, etc. But despite release of Rs 20 lakh, the mechanism for early warning systems had not been established and funds were surrendered. The SDMP also envisages establishment of Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) in each district for quick response and effective decision-making during emergencies. Though the State Executive Committee (SEC) earmarked (2013-14) Rs 2 crore for establishment of four EOCs in the districts of Jammu, Srinagar, Leh and Kargil in the first phase, they had not been established except Srinagar which has been established after floods . GoI also allocated 20 crore for the purpose of building capacity such as procurement of equipment for rescue and relief, establishment of early warning system in the district headquarters, creation of public awareness for pre-disaster preparedness and for imparting training to various stakeholders. Of this, Rs12 crore was released by GoI. However, the State Government could utilize only Rs1.79 crore. Consequently, balance funds of Rs 8 crore were not released by the GoI. Out of Rs 6.02 crore released in June 2014 to the Revenue Department for pre-disaster management activities, Rs 29 lakh was utilized as of March 2015 and balance amount of Rs 5.73 crore was surrendered. Similarly, Rs 32 lakh released through sanction to the Technical Education Department for skill up gradation of workers had not been utilized. Rs 25.24 lakh provided by GoI for ‘capacity building’ for disaster management was spent by the Revenue, Relief and Rehabilitation Department on procurement of vehicles during 2014-15 not covered under ‘capacity building’. While chapter on disaster management had been included in the academic curriculum by the State Board of School Education and certain initiatives had been taken such as conducting training programs on various aspects of disaster management and training of sarpanches , divisional level officers, engineers and volunteers, no steps were taken to increase public awareness about risk mitigation strategies.
All these CAG observations are really disturbing. Moreover, whatever post relief work had been done in all disasters audited by CAG, least codal formalities had been done resulting in rampant corruption and losses to the tune of crores . These institutional gaps have inhibited the ability of the State Government to prepare cohesive disaster management plans that would enable rapid response to disasters as they occur and mitigate their impact in terms of loss of lives and property. Though after this CAG report government has recently appointed full time Commissioner/Secretary for Department of Disaster Management, Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction as well as carved out separate Directorate of Disaster Management but the fact is it is too little for the kind of disasters in waiting. Politicians are mum , bureaucrats in slumber and public ignorant despite the fact that we all are sitting on a time bomb which can explode any time and the result can be catastrophic. With the easing of tensions in the valley one hopes government takes up SDMP seriously and plugs all loopholes pointed out by CAG in its report or otherwise like on previous occasions we are going to lose the plot once again.
“Take action! An inch of movement will bring you closer to your goals than a mile of intention.”
