Bhopinder Singh
As of now, the Maldivians are literally basking in the duality of attention and successfully playing China against India. The language of the Sino-Maldivian diplomatic engagement is a clear indicator of the shifting sands under President Abdulla Yameen
The fleet-footedness of the Chinese diplomacy and its strategic counter-moves is unparalleled. Less than five years ago, the Chinese had carefully plotted the dragnet of the String of Pearls strategy by punting on establishing Chinese military presence in the pro-Chinese regimes of the junta-ruled, Myanmar (at Sittwe port) and on the Dragon-tilting regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka (at Hambantota port).
These two ‘pearl ports’ alongwith the Gwadar port in the ‘all-weather-friend’ nation of Pakistan was potentially strangulating India with the specter of Chinese presence, floating menacingly in the Indian neighbourhood to establish its hegemony in the region. However, dynamics of time and tide changed everything on the global chessboard with changes that force recalibration of existing bilateral equations – within a quick span of time, democracy consumed the junta-rule in Myanmar with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (ideologically closer to India than China), controlling the establishment in Naypyidaw, and a decidedly pro-India Government of Maithripala Sirisena in Colombo took over from Mahinda Rajapaksa, thereby dashing the Chinese ambitions in these two, envisaged ‘pearl ports’ in Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
At around the same time, the traditionally pro-India Governments of Maldives, then ruled by President Mohamed Nasheed (from the Maldivian Democratic Part [MDP]) in Male paved way, initially for Mohammed Waheed Hassan and later for the current President, Abdulla Yameen (of the Progressive Party [PP], in power since November 2013). This local change of guard was accompanied with extreme bitterness and accusations between the Maldivian political parties – circumstantially, aiding a new political position to be seen, necessarily ‘different’ from the one held by the previous political dispensations, and hence, sacrificing the steadfast ‘India-first’ centricity that prevailed since the Maldivian independence in 1965.
The dragon smelt a providential opportunity to ‘invest’ in, and immediately pounced upon the favourable turn of political events in Maldives, as opposed to the negative regime changes in Sri Lanka and Myanmar, as far as the Chinese were concerned. Suddenly, Maldives woke up to be the centripetal point of the great geo-political game in the Indian Ocean between the two competing blocs (India versus the Chinese-Pakistani combine) and the local Maldivian dispensation has since, milked the tactical opportunity of extracting its pound of flesh from both.
This new reality is in sharp contrast to the historical India-Maldives equation that was bed-rocked on the interdependence of interests and the automatic preferential treatment afforded to each other – suddenly, a ‘balance’ amongst the competing suitors was sought (naively, including the Chinese footprint in the security calculus of the region, which was earlier restricted to India). Worrisomely, President Yameen has propounded the Look East policy towards China as a major partner in his Republic Day address, while his Vice President Ahmed Adeeb confirmed, “China is one of the closest friends and one of the most important development partners of Maldives”. This is an unmistakable augury of the Chinese ‘cheque-book diplomacy’ for buying new friends, a lathe Chinese tactics deployed in poor African countries which are seeing aggressive Chinese investments.
Like all Chinese investments, the diplomatic charm invariably sugarcoats the accompanying agenda of the steel of military might and strategic Chinese interests. In an unprecedented show of brewing friendship and of the strategic relations, Male witnessed a flurry and fury of Chinese President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President to visit Male in 2014. This visit was immediately followed by the controversial replacement of the contract for the Indian group GMR Infrastructure, to a Chinese group, Beijing Urban Construction Group Company Ltd, to upgrade the Male airport – recently, a $800 million contract to expand the airport further was also signed up with the Chinese consortium. This is in addition to the ‘China-Maldives Friendship Bridge’ project that spans from Male’s eastern edge to the western corner of the island of Hulhule, funded by the $126 million in grant aid from China – an unprecedented financial generosity in the Maldivian context.
The language of the Sino-Maldivian diplomatic engagement is a clear indicator of the shifting sands with President Yameen expressing, “profound gratitude” to Xi. He added for good measure, “Today you have made our impossible dream a reality”. However, India is more concerned about the strategic concessions that could have been passed to the Chinese, in lieu of these investments – as it is, Maldives is amongst the first signatories of the game-altering, Chinese ‘Maritime Silk Route’ initiative. Further, murmurs are rife about a potential Chinese naval base in Marao (though, steadfastly denied by the Maldivian authorities, pursuant to the stated commitment to remain a ‘demilitarised zone’) – and then, mid-last year, the shadowy and unconfirmed presence of a Chinese Yuan class 335 armed-submarine lurking in the Maldivian waters, knowingly or unknowingly, has further raised hackles in India.
