M. M Khajooria
The inhabitants of the border village of Arnia in
R S Pura sector of Indo-Pak border were accustomed to firing from across the border. They suffered in many ways- fatal causalities not excluded- but doggedly stuck on to their birth place as a matter of national duty. But the last bout of cross border confrontation which specifically targeted civilians introduced a new and worrisome element in the situation. Appropriate measures to make them secure were yet to be devised and put in place by the government .In the meantime there was no respite for them.
They had barely settled down after return from migration resulting from what was described by a senior commander of Pak Rangers as “the small war’ when guns started booming again.
On 26th November, Pakistani rangers resorted to unprovoked firing on the Pital border outpost in Arnia sub-sector. Even before Indian security forces could retaliate, four Fidayeen possibly constituted as a Border Action Team( BAT) comprising elements from terrorists and Pak Army/ Rangers had surfaced on our side of the international border about 4 Km inside the fenced border. Dressed in army uniforms they attacked the Indian Army base near the town of Arnia. The Fidayeen attack interestingly coincided with the SARC Summit in Khatmandu attended by Prime Minister Modi and Pak Prime Minister Nawaz Shrief. According to Chief Minister Omar Abdullah the attack “can’t be a
coincidence”.
The militants, witnesses stated, came in a car to Arnia divided into two teams, with one group heading for an army bunker, abandoned and unsecured. The other holed up inside a village house. The Fidayeen attack that lasted more than 36 hours yielded 12 dead– four terrorists, three security personnel and five civilians. In short in the ratio of one Pak terrorist to two Indians. A successful operation by any standard. Take into account the enormous international publicity, people across the world glued to TV sets watching the progress of attack and consequent focus on the so called Kashmir issue, the picture becomes clear and its implications obvious.
It was undoubtedly a multi-purpose operation. The dimensions were identified as:
1.Disturbing the on going electoral process which in the first phase in which more than 72 per cent electorate had cast their votes in Kashmir Valley causing alarm bells to ring in Islamabad. Interestingly, the army had only a day earlier told the media that militants were out to disturb the Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir but the forces were alert to foil their designs.
2.Disturbing PM Modi’s election rallies in Udhampur and Poonch. What impact could the fighting in Arnaia about 100 Km away from the venue of the Prime Ministers’ rally in udhampur and far war Poonch located bang on the LOC could have was a matter of determination.
3.Countering the positive impact of Modi-Shrief handshake in Khatmandu. This made sense from Pak point of view. The Fidayeen attack was meant to convey the message that the hand shake was a mere diplomatic courtesy. The aggressive K policy was very much on. But who ever in India thought otherwise. Even our own Pak friendly bleeding hearts at the best pushed for “building upon this positive development.”
The billion dollar question, however is how did the Fidayeen manage to reach where they did and ‘successfully’ accomplish their task? The BSF were on record affirming that there was no breach in the border fencing and the surveillance visual as well as technological were faultlessly operative. There is no reason to question their judgement. This leaves us broadly with two possibilities. One, entry through an undetected tunnel connecting the two sides of the fence. To exclude this possibility and with a view to ensure that the enemy is not able to gain entry to our side undetected, the entire border/ LoC belt needed to be physically as well as technologically scanned. It should not be forgotten that such tunnels have been detected earlier.
The other somewhat frightening possibility is that they managed to enter via the Punjab border and travelled undetected there from to Arnia, the same day or had entered earlier to recee the area and await directions from the handler. In this eventuality, there had to exist a functioning net work most likely with smuggling gangs, availability of safe houses / transit holes
and so on. Terrorists both of the Khalistan and K varieties had used this route for infiltration as well as smuggling of weapons in the past. For obvious reasons it will not be appropriate to spell out here the vastness of target zones that open up for terrorist operation and the extended reach they acquire if that can access the National Highway in secure environment. There is too much on stake. The answer has to be found quickly and the situation responded to effectively and conclusively in time . Pushing the issue under the carpet is certainly not an option.
And yes, we can not afford to leave unmanned and unsecured bunkers in the conflict Zone given the conflict profile, enemy strategy and the terrorist context. This was indeed a serious lapse.
