EXTRACTS FOR MEDIA
- Indira Gandhi on Maneka Gandhi
One day, in July 1980, barely 40 days after Sanjay’s death, I received a phone call from R.K. Dhawan, saying that the she wished to see me urgently. My office was at Janpath Road, and I hurried to meet her at her South Block office. On reaching there, Dhawan sent a slip of paper with my name to her chamber. I asked him if she was in a meeting. He answered in the affirmative, saying that Pranab da (then minister of commerce, steel and mines and the leader of the RajyaSabha) and P. Shiv Shankar (then minister of law, justice and company affairs) were with her. I reconciled to a long wait. Imagine my surprise when I was ushered in within a couple of minutes.
The two ministers and she were deep in some discussion, with several files open before them. On seeing me enter, she asked Pranab da and Shiv Shankar to leave, saying that the deliberations would continue some other time. I felt a little embarrassed that two senior ministers were peremptorily dismissed on account of my arrival. I am sure that they too must have been surprised. Once they left, she signalled me to take a chair and asked me about the activities of the IYC in general. I briefed her on whatever little that was happening. Then, out of the blue, she took out a few newspapers and placed them before me. She asked if I had seen them. I replied in the affirmative.
She asked, ‘What did you see?’
‘Nothing unusual,’ I replied.
‘Didn’t you notice the news item which said that Maneka had attended a tree plantation programme along with a few other Congress leaders? It is not even 40 days since Sanjay’s death and she is already attending events. How could she do it!’
There was no anger in Indira ji’s voice. I wondered if I should respond. I decided to keep quiet, considering that it was a family matter in which I should not interfere.
We then spoke of other matters. She suddenly shot another question: ‘Don’t you think Rajiv should join politics?’ I was surprised by the question but also understood the faith she had in me to raise such an issue. One reason for reposing such trust in me was because she knew of my proximity to Sanjay. The fact that he had attended my wedding was also known to her.
I had never given a thought to it and told her so, but added that it would be a good idea if Rajiv was to join politics. ‘But that’s where the problem is,’ she said, ‘He’s not interested, although I would like him to help me.’ - Indira Gandhi: Anything but dictatorial
During that short meeting, she told me that she had, six months earlier, asked Antulay and V.C. Shukla to identify one safe seat for me in their respective states but had directed them to keep the matter a secret. They never revealed this to me. She said that since I had been working so hard, I deserved to contest. Since J&K had been ruled out due to the arrangement with Sheikh sahab, I had to be given a seat from outside.
She also shared with me that it was for the first time that she had a say in the distribution of Lok Sabha seats from Maharashtra. Earlier, it used to be Y.B. Chavan who would distribute all the seats of the state. She further added that Jagjivan Ram would distribute Scheduled Caste (SC) seats for the entire country. I was astonished and realized how wrong people were when they used to say that she was like a dictator. Had she really been one, two of her senior colleagues would not have wielded such power under her party presidentship and prime ministership. It also showed how much she cared for the advice given to her by her colleagues. - The Last Meeting with Indira Gandhi
Dhawan informed me that the PM wanted to see me at her residence at Safdarjung Road. On arrival, I was ushered into the drawing room. It was for the first time that I had entered her residence for a meeting. I still remember that all the sofas in the room had pristine white covers. I normally used to meet the PM at her private office at Akbar Road, her South Block office or her Parliament office.
After a while, Indira ji entered. She was dressed casually, and little black droplets were dripping down her forehead. I brought it to her notice as diplomatically as I could. Similng, she said that she had just coloured her hair. She said it so disarmingly. With a motherly touch, she continued, ‘Tum to bachon ki tarahho(You are like a child), else I would not have come out in this state.’ - Pranab Mukherjee’s dream to become PM in 1984
Rajiv’s succession to prime ministership became the subject of much speculation. It was rumoured that Pranab da wanted to become the PM and had even lobbied for the position. Even if Pranab da had nurtured the ambition, there was no way he could have become the PM. The entire top brass of the party had known for long that Rajiv would one day succeed his mother. He had been groomed for four years for the responsibility—since he quit his job as a pilot, joined the IYC, became an MP, led the IYC and took over as general secretary of the parent organization. Not a single senior leader or MP would have backed Pranab da, particularly in the circumstances that prevailed then. There was also an outpouring of sympathy for Rajiv after Indira ji’s assassination.
Moreover, Rao was more senior and experienced than Pranab da, and he could have staked claim for the prime ministership. But he did not, perhaps for two reasons. The first was that he was not ambitious enough. The second was that he may have been consumed by guilt over his failure as home minister to prevent the massacre of Sikhs in the wake of Indira ji’s assassination. There were murmurs in the party that he was, to some extent, responsible for the terrible tragedy that befell innocent Sikhs. He must have had a lurking fear that, even if he pushed his name for prime ministership, it would have been rejected, and he would have lost face. - The rift between Rajiv Gandhi and Giani Zail Singh
There was one group within our party, led by a particular MoS, that was fuelling misunderstanding between the two constitutional heads. This person would tell Singh that Rajiv wanted to impeach him and the same person would feed Rajiv information that the president wanted to dismiss him over theBofors matter! The man was playing both ways. Congress MPs did not know how things would eventually turn and preferred to stay neutral. A few senior ministers saw in this confusion an opportunity to occupy the post of PM and kept quiet, preferring to keep the pot boiling.
The situation had become so tense that even I was apprehensive and avoided attending functions hosted at the Rashtrapati Bhavan, although I enjoyed very cordial relations with Singh. In fact, I knew him well before I got to know Rajiv.
However, it wasn’t that easy to deal with the tense situation arising out of the supposed cold war between Singh and Rajiv. On one occasion, the PM was at the Rashtrapati Bhavan. I also happened to be there and was seated at a distance from the two. During tea time, an aide of the president came and said that the president had asked for me. When I went to the president, Rajiv was still with him. Singh turned to the PM and complained that I had stopped attending functions at his house, adding that we had known each other since my Youth Congress days when Sanjay was the leader. Rajiv said he did not know of that. After that, I resumed my visits to the president’s house.
Around this time, there was speculation that the government wanted to impeach the president and that the president wanted to dismiss Rajiv. He wondered who was spreading such falsehood and said that some people were being mischevious and creating bad blood between Singh and himself. I personally believe that somebody who wanted to replace Rajiv as the PM or somebody who had harboured hopes of becoming the PM after Indira ji’s assassination could be the troublemaker.
I had the unenviable task of briefing the PM about the political firestorm triggered by the Bofors issue in Parliament during his absence. He called a meeting of the Council of Ministers and raised this issue. A senior minister from UP remarked that it was not the job of the ministers to defend the government and Rajiv; the party should take a lead in the matter. An infuriated Rajiv banged the table with both his palms and told the minister, ‘Why don’t you then quit the government and work for the party?’ He then rose in a huff and walked out, heading straight to his car. - Kaun Banega PM?
were also other names doing the rounds for prime ministership including those of Arjun Singh, Sharad Pawar and N.D. Tiwari. But each one of them had plus and minus points. Some of them had the support of MPs in their respective states, while others were being opposed by the MPs of their own states.
Arjun Singh, though a capable administrator and popular national leader, was at loggerheads with other senior leaders of his own state of Madhya Pradesh, such as Madhavrao Scindia, Motilal Vora and the Shukla brothers—Shyama Charan Shukla and Vidya Charan Shukla. Another reason against him was that only two-and-a-half years earlier, he had had to give up the chief ministership of Madhya Pradesh on the advice of the CPB because of the Churhat Lottery controversy. Although the state had elected a good number of Congress MPs, yet the name of Arjun Singh could not be considered.
Another strong contender was the strongman of Maharashtra, Sharad Pawar, who was experienced and a down-to-earth leader. Hehad a number of points in his favour. One, age was on his side. Two, he represented one of the biggest states of the country, Maharashtra. Three, he was a resourceful leader with national appeal. Four, most importantly, he had good relationships with the leaders of other political parties across the country. Unfortunately, he could not qualify as a candidate. It was pointed out that he had joined the Congress party only two–three years back. Doubts were raised on whether he would gel with the party rank and file and whether he would be able to carry everybody along. Another thing that went against him was that a few of his close friends became more active in their campaign to choose him as the PM candidate, and this campaign, instead of helping him, went against him. However, Pawar being who he is, a powerful leader yet polite and gentle, did not pursue his candidature beyond a point, even though his leadership would have provided stability to the Congress party in the long run.
There were also talks of N.D. Tiwari nurturing ambitions of becoming PM, but his candidature was a non-starter. He was soft-spoken, politically sound and affectionate and could strike friendships even with his rivals. His plus point was that he belonged to UP, then the biggest state of the country. However, there was huge resentment against him for destroying the party and ensuring the defeat of his own government both in the Assembly and in Parliament elections in 1989 while he was CM. The reason behind this was that when he was made CM in 1988 by replacing Vir Bahadur Singh, instead of being happy, he became hostile against the leadership. As a result, from mid-1988 till the November 1989 Lok Sabha and Assembly Elections were held, instead of working hard to ensure the return of the Congress party to power, he openly defied the leadership and worked hard against party interests. He virtually paralysed the state government, which finally resulted in the huge defeat of the Congress party in UP, in both the Assembly and the Lok Sabha.
Thus, in 1989, the Congress got only 15 Lok Sabha seats and a little over 90 seats in the Assembly, which was one of the major reasons for the party not returning to power in 1989. As a result, the members of the CPB, the CWC, senior leaders and Congressmen of UP were angry with Tiwari. This defeat in UP had adverse short-term and long-term effects on the performance of the Congress party. The short-term effect was that in the 1991 elections, the number of Congress MPs further dropped from 15 to five. The long-term effect continues till date. With these matters in mind, no one was ready to consider the name of Tiwari for prime ministership. - PM Rao’s failure in preventing Babri demolition
It was 6 December 1992. The Babri mosque in Ayodhya was demolished by a rampaging mob. The incident led to large-scale violence in many parts of the country—riots broke out and a few terror attacks took place. The country went through traumatic times, and the Rao government as well as the party in general, and the PM in particular, came under serious attack.
The demolition presented a major crisis for the Rao government. People held the government, especially the PM and Home Minister S.B. Chavan, responsible for being a party to the demolition, directly or indirectly. But in my view, the government could not be held responsible because the Supreme Court had given permission to the Kar Sevaks to gather there. Nonetheless, there was a strong buzz within and outside the Congress party that, notwithstanding the court permission, Rao and Chavan should have anticipated the worst since thousands of people in a frenzied state of mind would be gathering at the disputed site. Anything could have happened. No doubt, the KarSeva was being led by senior and responsible members of the BJP. But once the mob goes wild, even the leaders find it impossible to control it. The government could have, as a matter of abundant precaution, ordered the deployment of central paramilitary forces at the disputed site and nearby well before the incident. They could have intervened to save the situation. Unfortunately, that was not done.
What was even more unfortunate was that the PM and home minister were not reachable from the morning when the demolition of the mosque began: They could not be contacted over the phone. It was only after the demolition that the Cabinet was convened at four in the evening. When it became clear that the mob, equipped with all sorts of tools to demolish the mosque, was getting aggressive, had the home minister been accessible or the Cabinet convened earlier, steps could have been taken to rush paramilitary forces. It is possible that by the time the forces arrived, the damage would have been done. But at least the government, especially the PM and the home minister, could have been absolved of the allegation that they did nothing to stop the demolition.
Further, the Union government had no control over the state police machinery, and trusting the word of the state government headed by Kalyan Singh—that everything would be under control on 6 December at the Ayodhya site—was not justified. And so, in the Cabinet meeting in the immediate aftermath of the demolition, it was decided to dismiss the four BJP-ruled state governments—UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh—for their complicity in the demolition. - The Congress party’s problems with PM Deve Gowda
Problems began to manifest between PM Deve Gowda and the Congress party after a few months, when he came under the influence of ill-placed advice by some of his colleagues. The first advice they gave him was that he should start an extensive tour in North India and project himself as a farmers’ leader and an alternative to the Congress in the Hindi belt. The idea was to replace the Congress in the region. The Janata Dal was a known name in North India, and Deve Gowda, who was already an established name in the southern part of the country, thought he could get a toehold in the North too, using his party’s leverage. We in the Congress party felt outraged that Deve Gowda, who depended on Congress’s support, was seeking to undermine us in our stronghold. The second advice that was given to him was that his government should initiate various cases against Congress leaders. The idea was to put the Congress on the defensive and pre-empt any chance of withdrawal of support.
Both these suggestions backfired on the PM. Senior leaders met Kesri and told him that things would go awry for us if Deve Gowda was allowed to continue in office, since he was determined to cut the very branch that supported him. It was decided to tell the Janata Dal that Deve Gowda’s continuance was untenable and that he should be replaced. Thus, I.K. Gujral, a well-respected, learned, experienced gentleman and a leader of stature, became the PM in 1997. - On Sonia Gandhi
Indira ji had once remarked to me that Sonia Gandhi was not in favour of Rajiv joining politics. One of our Youth Congress leaders, Naeem from Hyderabad, had designed a huge poster of Rajiv, with Sanjay’s five-point programme depicted on each of Rajiv’s fingers. It was an impressive image and Indira ji showed it to Sonia ji, in the hope that she would like it and change her mind about her husband joining politics. I think it worked. - Convincing Sonia to join politics: It’s now or never
Sonia ji’s name was proposed as Kesri’s replacement, and there was unanimity on the choice amongst the party’s senior leaders. In the limited campaigning that she had done, she had struck a chord with the people. As part of the Nehru–Gandhi family, she commanded respect and admiration within the Congress party. The challenge was to convince her to enter active politics. At the CWC meeting, it was decided that Pawar and Antony would immediately go to her residence, which was a stone’s throw away from the party’s Akbar Road office, where the CWC was meeting, and get her consent. They left, promising to be back soon. The CWC members waited at the party headquarters for them to return, hopefully, with good news.
We had thought that Antony and Pawar would return in five to 10 minutes or 15 at the most, but half an hour passed, then one and there was still no sign of them. The members then asked me to go to her residence and check on the progress. When I reached there, I found Sonia ji and the two leaders, each seated separately on three different sofas, not even talking to one another. It was clear that the conversation had been over, probably in the first few minutes that they had met. I looked at them questioningly. Pawar and Antony said that ‘madam’ was unwilling.
I then asked Sonia ji what the problem was. She said that she wanted time to think. I asked her how much time she needed. She said, ‘Six months.’ We could not wait for six months since the CWC meeting was on and we had to decide immediately, I pointed out.
‘First, tell me madam, are you willing to join politics?’ I asked.
She answered in the affirmative but stuck to the six-month time period. ‘Six months is a long time in politics,’ I told her. I added, ‘There is a vacancy now and that the vacancy might not exist six months later. It is possible that some competent person would become the party chief and may not be amenable to relinquishing the post for you six months down the line. You have to decide. It’s now or never. Timing is of great essence in politics,’ with that, I concluded my brief sales pitch.
Sonia ji was lost in thought. After about five minutes, she looked up and said she was ready to take on the mantle. We were relieved andhappy. The CWC, thereafter, lost no time in passing another resolution, electing her as the president, of course in her absence. Sonia ji then took over as the Congress party president. - Hoodwinking the BJP in Bellary
There was to be one more nataka in Karnataka when the Vajpayee government failed to muster the support during the vote of confidence on 17 April 1999, as a result of which Lok Sabha elections were announced on 4 May. Thus, the Karnataka Assembly Elections came to be held along with the Lok Sabha elections. The Congress Central Elections Committee met, and ticket distribution took place for the entire country. It was decided that Sonia ji would contest from Raebareli. Then an idea occurred to me, and I took it to her. I wanted her to contest from one of the parliamentary seats in Karnataka. I argued that her victory fromRaebareli was a foregone conclusion and would be no big deal; itwas a family bastion. In order to emerge as a national leader, she mustalso contest from a southern state. I told her that I had the Bellary constituency in Karnataka in mind, and the sitting MP, K.C. Kondaiah, had volunteered to leave the seat for her. It would be an additional feather in her cap, I added. Meanwhile, Kondaiah also met her and repeated the offer.
She was initially reluctant but was eventually persuaded. I told her that she need not even campaign in the constituency; I would take care of it and she would only have to file the nomination papers and make just one appearance. After that, I requested her to keep the matter a secret. I had earlier asked the sitting MP from Bellary to also not reveal the matter to anyone. Thus, nobody else was aware of what I was planning.
One reason for the secrecy was to take the BJP at the national level and the Janata Dal in the state by surprise. One of their fiery leaders, George Fernandes, had already announced that he would contest against her if she stood from anywhere in Karnataka—there had already been a media buzz that Sonia ji would seek election from a southern state apart from Raebareli. I did not want that to happen—not because I was worried that she would lose; I was confident of her victory. But Fernandes, though an honest and upright man, could not control his acerbic tongue! He had a reputation of using rough language, and there was no telling what he would say against her during the campaigning. After all, he had been inimical to the Gandhi family since his trade union days. I was wary of the campaign getting bitter and did not want to stoop to low levels to counter it. Meanwhile, taking initiative, our Andhra Pradesh CLP leader, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy, had invited Sonia ji to contest from his state’s Kadapa constituency in the Rayalaseema region. This came in handy for us to maintain the facade. We announced that Sonia ji had accepted the invite. A day before the nominations closed, we took a flight to Hyderabad instead of going to Bengaluru. I accompanied Sonia ji along with Vincent George. For all apparent, she was to file her nomination from Kadapa. Even Rajasekhara did not know about the game plan while he went about making preparations for her nomination fromKadapa constituency! For good measure, after landing at Hyderabad airport for a night stay, I told the waiting mediapersons that Sonia ji had decided to contest from Kadapa, Andhra Pradesh, not from Bellary as enquired by them. I further added that we would have gone to Bengaluru for the night stay instead of coming to Hyderabad, if she had to contest from Bellary. On hearing the announcement post my press briefing at Hyderabad airport, the BJP decided on the candidature of the well-known film star Vijayashanti from Kadapa against Sonia ji.
Early the next morning, we took a special flight to Bellary, which thankfully had an airstrip. Sonia ji’s security detail was with her. When the plane touched ground, her security personnel exclaimed that it was not Kadapa. I replied, much to their amazement, that indeed it was not; it was Bellary!
Preparations had been silently made in Bellary at the returning officer’s office with the help of the MP who had vacated the seat. Sonia ji filed her nomination papers, with the local police making massive security arrangements with Kondaiah’s help. The news spread like wildfire; the BJP and Janata Dal CM of Karnataka were taken aback. Poor Fernandes was somewhere in the Northeast, and it was impossible for him to dash back to Bellary in time. The BJP dispatched Sushma Swaraj to Bellary by a special flight as a contestant, and she filed her papers a few minutes before nominations closed that evening; it was also the last day for filing the nominations.
We had outwitted Fernandes and the NDA government at the Centre and the Janata Dal government in the state. - Relinquishing Raebareli in favour of Priyanka
Two days after the election results, I met Sonia ji. Since she had been elected from both Bellary and Raebareli, I suggested that she keep Bellary and give up the latter in favour of her daughter Priyanka Gandhi Vadra because, during those days, she was involved in lookingafter the constituency. Rahul was not in politics nor did I have any idea that Sonia ji was keen to bring him into it, so his name was not in the reckoning then. This decision of retaining Bellary, I added, would strengthen the Congress’s presence in southern India. I told her that I would handle the developmental work in her constituency. But Sonia ji didn’t say anything. I believed that my suggestion had registered positively in her mind. But a few days later, she resigned from the Bellary seat and retained Raebareli. I am unaware of her reasons. - Sonia deals with ND Tiwari’s tantrums
I believed that government formation in Uttarakhand would be an easy task. Back in Delhi after the impressive results, I met Sonia ji in the evening and discussed government formation. I told her that Rawat was the best choice for the CM’s post. He deserved the elevation, having put in his heart and soul into the campaign that I had chalked out. Besides, he was the PCC chief and a known face across the state. My plan was to fly to Uttarakhand the following morning after getting her approval and initiate the process of electing the leader and government formation with Rawat as its head.
Sonia ji did not object to my suggestion but said that before going to Uttarakhand, I should meet Tiwari and get him on board. I stated that there was no need to consult him; his contribution to the party’s victory was zero. In fact, he had proved to be an impediment. However, for some reason, she insisted, saying that he could later issue statements that would embarrass the party and the new government there. He might grumble that the party had not considered it fit to seek the advice of a veteran like him. I reluctantly agreed. That very night, around 10.00 p.m., I went over to Tiwari’s Delhi residence.
Tiwari was fast asleep, so I told his aide that he needed to be woken up since the matter was urgent. After a while, I was ushered into his bedroom on the first floor, where I found him in sleeping clothes.
He enquired about the chief ministerial candidate and government formation, and I said that Rawat would head the government. Besides being PCC president, Rawat had contributed enormously to the party’s success in the election. Tiwari didn’t say anything, and I took his silence for concurrence and returned home.
I telephoned Sonia ji to brief her about my meeting with Tiwari. To my utter amazement, she informed me that Tiwari had called her, soon after I must have left his residence, and had sought an appointment with her for the following morning. She asked me to defer my visit to Uttarakhand.
Tiwari met her the next morning around 10.00 a.m. and left after about 45 minutes. Thereafter, I called upon Sonia ji at her 10, Janpath residence. She dropped a bombshell: ‘Tiwari wants to be the chief minister,’ she said, adding, ‘in fact, he has insisted on it.’ I was aghast. ‘He had done nothing to deserve the post,’ I said. Moreover, I had already sounded out Rawat about the possibility of him becoming the CM. But Sonia ji had made up her mind in Tiwari’s favour, so I had no option but to accept the decision. It is possible that Sonia ji thought that Tiwari, being a senior person and of advanced age, should be given an opportunity which he might not get later. On the other hand, Rawat was young and would get several chances. Besides, Uttarakhand had been newly formed and needed an experienced administrator to take it on the path of development.
I called up Rawat and explained the situation to him and requested him to accept it. Like a loyal soldier of the party, he did. However, his supporters, about 13 of them, did not turn up for the CLP meeting. It took two-three days for me to persuade them before we could finally elect Tiwari as the CLP leader. I felt really sorry for Rawat. - Dealing with Mufti’s Backdoor Entry
With the letter of support of 42 MLAs in my hand, I telephoned the governor, and he invited me the following day to discuss the date of oath-taking. I informed Sonia ji about the developments over telephone. She was happy to hear that I was now taking charge of government formation.
A few hours before the meeting with the governor, around 8.00 a.m., I was in the balcony of my room of Hotel Broadway in Srinagar, having tea with Ashok Bhan, a friend, Congressman and lawyer of the Supreme Court, when a thought occurred to me. Perhaps it was driven by emotion. I told Bhan that I should ask Mufti’s party to join the government. I had a long family association with him, which I had maintained even after his split with the Congress. Though I did not need his backing to form the government, I believed that with him on board, the government would be even more stable and could perform better. Besides, he had been a Congressman, and his MLAs could be co-opted in the government.
I telephoned Mufti and informed him that I would be meeting the governor at 11.00 a.m. I suggested that his party could be part of the government and asked him to give me names of five–six MLAs of his party who could be accommodated as ministers. He said that it was a good idea and immediately invited me for breakfast, saying that I could go to the Raj Bhavan after having breakfast with him; I readily agreed. I had breakfast with him at his residence and repeated my offer.
He heard me out and said that he wanted three–four days to think it over. He suggested that I better defer my meeting with the governor until then. I should have seen through his game plan then and gone ahead with the oath-taking; after all, his party could have joined the government later. But I trusted him implicitly and did notspot his deviousness. How was I to know that he would throw our personal relations to the wind and misuse my generosity! I met the governor and briefed him about my talks with Mufti that morning, also informing him that I would get back to him after three–four days.
I returned to Delhi and narrated the whole story to Sonia ji. It was decided that Dr Manmohan Singh, then the LoP in the Rajya Sabha, and I would fly to Srinagar and meet the PDP leader to firm up his party’s inclusion in the government. The following day, Dr Singh and I went to Srinagar and had lunch with Mufti, during which he confirmed his party’s participation in the government.
Thereafter, Sonia ji invited Mufti to Delhi for the final announcement of the alliance. I, too, was present at the meeting. Mufti thanked the Congress president and me for agreeing to his party’s participation in the government. But when he was asked for names from his party who could be part of my government, he suddenly got up in an agitated state and exclaimed, ‘I thought that I had been invited to be the chief minister!’ Sonia ji and I were aghast and said that no such indication or assurance had been given from our side at any point of time. Mufti nearly shouted back that he had been called to Delhi to be insulted. ‘Why was I called? I could have been informed over the telephone.’ It was clear that he wanted to hijack the government.
When matters seemed to be going out of hand, I intervened and requested Sonia ji that an arrangement could be worked out by which I would be CM for the first three years and Mufti could take over for the next three years (then the J&K government’s term was of six years). This way, everyone would be happy.
However, Mufti, having got a toehold, now wanted full entry through the door. He insisted on being the CM for the first three years. Sonia ji was in no mood to relent. Again, I requested her that in the larger interest of the state, we should agree to his demand. That is how Mufti, whose party had come third in the elections, with just 16 MLAs, became the CM, while I, despite having the support of 42 MLAs, had to return to national politics. - Sonia refuses to be the PM
Being the single largest party, a group of our senior party leaders, including me, began talks with the LDF, DMK, SP, BSP, Nationalist Congress Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal and other like-minded parties. We would tell them that Sonia ji was our choice for PM, and they had no problems with
that. However, the BJP upped the ante, with Sushma Swaraj declaring that she would shave her head if Sonia ji, a person of foreign origin, became India’s PM. Sonia ji was upset by the opposition to her name as the PM candidate and decided that the government could not begin its administration with such controversies. She ended the unsavoury matter by opting out of the race despite being elected as leader of the parliamentary party and declared Manmohan Singh as the Congress party’s prime ministerial choice. At the meeting of senior leaders, when Sonia ji had declined, I had walked out. I have no idea why she chose to reject the overwhelming demand that she take over as the PM. It is said that she took the decision after discussions with her family members. Another meeting was called the same day at 4.00 p.m., which I did not attend. Once she had said a clear ‘no’ to prime ministership, I had lost interest in persuading her further.
There were several claimants to the post who had nurtured hopes of becoming PM. Pranab da must have placed hopes too. But everyone agreed that Dr Singh was a good choice: he was a gentleman; had personal integrity; did not belong to any group and was knowledgeable, accessible, modest and, above all, an economist of international repute.
The group of senior leaders then briefed the potential allies about the new development. Pranab da, Ahmed Patel and I did several rounds of discussion with other leaders. Some of these parties joined the government; others like the Left and the SP supported us from outside. That is how the UPA government came into being. Talks then began on the formation of the ministry. Sonia ji, Dr Singh, Patel and I had series of meetings on government formation. In Sonia ji’s presence, I requested Patel to join the ministry, but he politely declined, laughingly saying that I had to be part of the government without fail. ‘You are the campaigner on the ground and also a good minister whereas I am just an observer from Delhi!,’ he said graciously. I also proposed the name of Ambika Soni, but she too declined to be a minister as she was the political advisor to Sonia ji. She was happier in that role, enjoying more power. - Rahul mismanages Himanta episode
The Congress party’s determination to destroy itself was even more evident in Assam. We had our government led by Tarun Gogoi. Hehad become the CM in May 2001 and went on to serve in that post until May 2016.
For 14 years of his tenure, a young and dynamic politician, Dr Himanta Biswa Sarma, was his right-hand man and a minister who held several important portfolios, including health and education. He was among the best-performing health ministers in the country, and I interacted with him on several occasions when I was the Union minister for health and family welfare. I had also an opportunity to attend a number of health-related camps and functions organized by him in Assam.
He came across as smart and politically astute, with a huge following of his own. He also commanded the support of many MLAs. After Gogoi became CM for the first time in 2001, he promised Himanta that he would step down if the party got a second term and recommend him for chief ministership.
After the party won a second term in 2006, Gogoi went back on his word and assured Himanta, again, that he would most certainly suggest his name for chief ministership if the party returned to power. However, yet again, Gogoi refused to keep his promise when he was sworn-in for the third time in 2011. Himanta was justifiably upset.
Sometime during Gogoi’s third term, Himanta decided to part ways with Gogoi. He had the support of a majority of legislators in the Assembly. He dashed off a letter to Governor J.B. Patnaik, claiming that he had backing of majority of MLAs and that he, along with his group, were withdrawing support to the Gogoi regime. He quit the Cabinet.
Parliament was not in session, and I had gone to Srinagar. Sonia ji asked me to visit Assam as an observer along with the general secretary in charge of the state to ascertain the situation. I told her that it was better to first verify the claims and counterclaims in Delhi because if I went to Assam straightaway and found Himanta’s claim to be true, there would be no option but to ask Gogoi to step down right away. She agreed.
I called Himanta and his group to Delhi; he came with 45 plus MLAs to my residence, and I spoke to each one of them. A few days later, I asked Gogoi to come to Delhi or send his MLAs. He sent seven MLAs who were supporting him. I also deliberated with therest of the 10 MLAs who had said they would abide by the party high command’s decision on supporting either of the two leaders. In all these meetings, the general secretary concerned was present.
I reported the situation to Sonia ji, who remarked that it was obvious that Himanta had a clear majority and should be the new CM. She asked me to go to Assam the following day along with the general secretary in-charge and oversee the formal election of Himanta as the new leader. The evening before we were to proceed to Assam, Rahul, who had not been in the loop of deliberations so far, telephoned me with a request to cancel the visit to Assam. Instead, he asked me to visit his home the next morning along with the general secretary in charge of Assam.
When we arrived at Rahul’s residence the next morning, we saw Tarun Gogoi and his son, Gaurav Gogoi, sitting with him. Rahul told us bluntly that there would be no change in leadership. We pointed out to him that Himanta had the majority of MLAs and would rebel and quit the party. ‘Let him go,’ Rahul said. The meeting was over. I am not sure if Rahul said this to assert himself or because he was ignorant that his decision would have far-reaching consequences, not only in the state of Assam but the entire Northeast. Himanta had been the party in-charge of the entire Northeast from time to time and particularly during elections in these states, where he was very popular. After leaving the Congress, he used this influence against the party and ensured the party’s complete rout from the entire Northeast. So, the exit of one capable person sounded the death knell for the party in the entire region.
After our interaction with Rahul, I met Sonia ji and apprised her of the new twist in the tale. Despite understanding the disastrous consequences that lay ahead, it is rather unfortunate that she did not assert herself as the party president. Instead, she asked me to request Himanta to not rock the boat. She added that he would surely heed my appeal, since he had tremendous regard and respect for me. I spoke to Himanta, who was good enough to accept my request. However, he refused to take back his resignation. It goes to Himanta’s credit that he allowed the Congress government to continue and did not pull the rug for another year. - Leadership failure in Punjab
Take the case of Punjab, the only poll-bound state that had a Congress government. I was taught, perhaps back in middle school, that one must not change horses mid-stream. If we change, then we shall be swept away by the waves. Yet, the party’s central leadership did exactly what ought not to have been done. They changed the incumbent CM, Captain Amarinder Singh, just four months before the election, in fact, even as the campaigning was already on! Ideally, this leadership change should have been done at least two–three years earlier. It would have given the new CM time to settle down and perform, so that he could have appeared before the people with some concrete achievements.
This blunder was further compounded by the manner in which the change of leadership was undertaken. The Congress legislatureparty met to discuss leadership change without even informing the leader of the legislature party—Amarinder, who was also the CM! It was absolutely ridiculous and very insulting. The CLP meeting was Delhi sponsored; it should have been state sponsored. The result was that an insulted Amarinder walked out of the party. Moreover, even while he was the CM, a host of local Congress leaders launched a barrage of attacks on him, making the voters wonder whether the Congress was fighting the Opposition or its own leader. The leadership, instead of stopping this nonsense, was encouraging it.
If the central leadership wanted Amarinder to quit, it should have deputed a senior and experienced leader who commanded respect and had friendly relations with him, like Bhupinder Singh Hooda and few others who know him well, to persuade him. The matter could have been handled diplomatically and resolved without causing hurt to the incumbent CM and the party.
This was not the only mistake the leadership made in Punjab. Once Amarinder was out, the Congress leadership gave the responsibility to someone who was not up to the task. The leadership replaced the PCC president with a new face, who proceeded to attack his own CM, calling him and his family members corrupt. The new state president even warned the public in the midst of election campaigns against trusting the CM’s promises because he would not return to power!
There is an old saying, ‘God helps those who help themselves.’ In Punjab, the Congress was determined to destroy itself; why would God have come forward to help the Congress? - Farooq Abdullah vs. Jagmohan in J&K
In January 1990, Jagmohan Malhotra was appointed as the governor of the state against the wishes of CM Farooq Abdullah. Both did not see eye to eye; they never did even during Jagmohan’s earlier stint in 1984 when Rajiv was the PM and the NC was then in alliance with the Congress party in the state. It was during this first stint of Farooq as the CM that his government was toppled by a rebellion led by G.M. Shah, his brother-in-law, who was also a senior minister. The NC split into two groups, one owing allegiance to Farooq and the other to Shah. Shah did not have the majority to form the government, but Mufti, who was the state Congress president and also bitterly opposed to Farooq,extended support to Shah. These developments had happened under Governor Jagmohan’s watch.
During CM Shah’s tenure, the government remained unstable, and Jagmohan exploited the situation to exert his authority and became more assertive. Even after the coalition of the NC under Farooq’s leadership and the Congress party coming to power in November 1986, Jagmohan continued to throw his weight, which angered Farooq. In the midst of Jagmohan’s over-assertiveness, three horrific massacres of civilians took place in the state. The governor was held accountable and removed within a few months.
Jagmohan’s second-time arrival compounded the problem for both the Centre and the state. Farooq was against Jagmohan’s appointment as governor. He was correct in saying that he couldn’t have fought militancy without the full support of the governor. He decided to quit against the appointment. With Farooq’s resignation, J&K again came under Governor’s Rule. With this decision, the Congress party and NC completely lost connect with the state administration headed by Jagmohan; at the national level, the Congress party was already in Opposition since December 1989. - G23 and after
The letter that the G23 leaders wrote to Congress President Sonia ji in August 2020 marked the beginning of the end. Unfortunately, instead of taking this letter as a wake-up call and strengthening the organization and holding party elections on the lines we had suggested, both Rahul and Sonia ji took offence and viewed it as a challenge to their authority. Instead of heeding our advice, they dubbed us as being pro-BJP. I still wonder—if we were pro-BJP, why would we suggest strengthening the organization? Rather, we would simply let things continue as they are and make the dream of a Congress-mukt Bharat (Congress-free India)—which the current leadership seems to have embarked upon—come true.
The immediate effect of this letter was that I was dropped from the general secretary position in the party. I was also dropped from the national star campaign after 40 years—I had been in the national campaign committee since 1980 and had the privilege of campaigning for the party across the country for panchayat, state and national elections and even for the president of the country. This was despite the fact that I have always liked party work more than government or parliamentary duties. But writing a letter to strengthen the same organization cost me heavily. - Request for renomination from Sonia and Rahul
The last thing that I had was the Rajya Sabha seat, whose term ended in February 2021. I could have asked Sonia ji or Rahul for a renomination, but I didn’t since my state assembly had been dissolved. I wasn’t expecting it either. They had taken away the post of general secretary and my position in the star campaign committee after four decades, so how could I expect that I would be renominated from another state like several of my other G23 colleagues? So, from February that year till August 2022, I had no party or legislative work to do. I was sitting at home, meeting people coming from different parts of the country. But I could not do anything for them since none of my recommendations were entertained at any level within the party.
I realized that the situation in the Congress party had reached a point of no return. It was then I decided, albeit with an extremely leaden heart, to call time on my half-a-century old association with the party. On 26 August, in a letter addressed to then Congress President Sonia ji, I resigned from all positions including the primary
membership of the party. From the complete demolition of the party’s consultative mechanism by Rahul to the rise of a new coterie of inexperienced sycophants to run the affairs of the party; from the remote-control model that destroyed the institutional integrity of this great organization to the manner in which proxies were being propped up to take over the leadership of the party, it was a no-holds-barred account of how the Grand Old Party had lost both the will and the ability to fight for what is right for India. - On Narendra Modi
In my long political journey, I have had friends in almost every political party and shared warm ties with them. Among them is PM Narendra Modi. A lot has been said about my relationship with him. I have known Modi since the late 1990s, when he was the general secretary of his party and I was the general secretary of mine. Both of us would also occasionally come face to face on television debates. However, before the show or after, we would have tea in the TV studio at the request of the anchors. My first impression about him was that he did not know much. I thought that the BJP had sent just another person from Gujarat for the TV discussion. But when it was his chance to speak, he turned out to be very different. He was vocal, firm, knowledgeable and well- prepared on the subjects being discussed. He did not duck a single questi on. He was one of the best participants in the subsequent discussions. Still, I never imagined that he would one day be the CM, let alone a powerful PM. Several years later, as health minister, I got the opportunity to interact with all CMs, including Modi, who was then CM of Gujarat, to ensure that central and state governments are on the same page while implementing health-related schemes. We would also interact with each other when both of us were CMs of our respective states and had the opportunity to have discussions on various issues whenever we would meet at CMs conferences. As CM, Modi would organize an annual kite festival as a means to promote tourism in Gujarat, and he would invite me to the event. However, as I had no interest in kite flying, I never went, though I would thank him for his invitation. - Modi in Parliament
Prime Minister Modi would attend the Rajya Sabha proceedings when the Question Hour of his ministry was slated. However, he would not reply to any of the questions; his capable MoS in charge of the PMO did the needful, like all previous PMs. My interaction with PM Modi was mostly during the all-party meetings that he chaired before every Parliament session (thrice a year), unlike the previous PMs. It is to his credit that he would meet and address floor leaders of all political parties of both Houses of Parliament before the commencement of every Parliament session. However, unfortunately, he never spoke in Parliament about his foreign visits, unlike all his predecessors.
In these meetings, PM Modi would always assure the Opposition leaders that every issue that the Opposition parties wanted to raise would be discussed on the floor of House. He was very clear on this issue and wanted every issue be discussed threadbare to the satisfaction of the Opposition. However, despite his assurances, such discussions never happened to the extent they should have inside the House. In my opinion, the minister of parliamentary affairs and the ministers in charge of those particular subjects that were to be discussed would ensure that the discussion didn’t take place.
The other thing that PM Modi would do during Parliament sessions, which benefitted his party immensely, was that he would hold weekly meetings with all MPs of his party. I believe he would even pull up his MPs who had not performed well according to his expectations or had a poor attendance in Parliament. I wish the Congress party had also undertaken a similar exercise, which incidentally existed during the tenure of Indira ji and, to some extent, during the tenures of Rajiv and Rao. Sadly, this practice totally disappeared during the last two-and-a-half decades.
Throughout my speeches, I found Modi to be a great listener. Not even once did he rebut my arguments or speak against me, inside or outside Parliament. He would always remain calm, though he would taunt me by making some political references. But he never attacked me personally. This may also have been because, unlike other leaders, I would not call the PM or other members of the ruling party names or abuse them. But some other leaders would only think of pleasing the Congress leadership by abusing the BJP and its leaders without making any substantial contribution or suggestion on the floor of the House that could pin down the government. In the Congress party, some leaders feel that abusing the Opposition and calling names is the only way to fight the political rival. I have always felt that Opposition parties, whether in the Assembly, Parliament or outside, are our competitors and not our enemies. So while speaking, each political party must keep this in mind and not cross the Lakshman Rekha.
- PM Modi’s farewell speech
On 9 February, my seven-year stint came to an end. I could not be re-elected since the J&K Assembly had been dissolved. Like my colleagues, I too was given a farewell by way of speeches, which is customary in the House of Elders. The chairperson was the first speaker. I am highly obliged to Venkaiah Naidu, who made an excellent speech and said many good words about me. I shall be beholden to him for the observations he made about me.
The second speaker was PM Modi. He praised me for my performance as LoP and for being a good human being. His speech was totally unlike his other speeches. He got very emotional, especially when narrating a particular incident. Everyone had forgotten about it, as it was from 15 years back, when I was the CM. I too had forgotten about it. He went back to 25 May 2006, when militants in Srinagar had hurled a grenade at a tourist bus carrying tourists from Gujarat. The attack took place when the government shifted to Kashmir in the first week of May, and the militants attempted to create a sense of fear and panic in me. They ‘welcomed’ me by killing innocent people in this horrifying incident.
On the morning of 25 May, I received information that militants had attacked a bus carrying passengers from Gujarat. Some passengers, including two children, were killed and several were injured. The bodies of the dead had been mutilated. The site of the attack—in the neighbourhood of Batpora—was close to my official residence, so I was able to rush to the site immediately and saw women and children weeping bitterly. I too was moved to tears. It was at this juncture that CM Modi called me. My staff told him that I was in no condition to speak with him since I was completely shattered.
I spoke to him a while later even as I continued to weep. He wanted the dead bodies to be sent immediately to Gujarat. I spoke to Dr Singh and requested an Air Force aircraft to transport the dead and injured. After taking the injured to the hospital, I ensured that the dead bodies were kept safely. By the evening, the aircraft arrived. We were also ready to send the bodies around that time. We knew how methodical Modi was; he and his office kept enquiring on an hourly basis about the injured passengers and the dead bodies so that his government could receive them in Gujarat.
I went to see off the mortal remains and the rest of the tourists at the airport. As I entered the aircraft, they all began weeping. I too was unable to control my emotions. Meanwhile, Modi called again. I choked and could hardly speak. Addressing the tourists, I could only ask for forgiveness. I said, ‘You had come to enjoy Kashmir, and instead I am sending back dead bodies. So, please forgive me.’
The media in Gujarat reported this much more than the national media did. Modi had seen all this on TV. I think a similar emotion arose in the PM during this farewell speech. He choked and could not speak; he just saluted. It was kind of him to have remembered a 15-year-old incident and share it at the most appropriate juncture in Parliament. He went to the extent of saying that I had called him as if my own family members had been killed. That was his way of describing me as a good human being. I am thankful to him.
Prime Minister Modi’s farewell speech, which was given wide coverage by the media, should have been a matter of great pride for the Congress party as well as its leadership, as a senior member of the party was feted by none less than the PM and by the leaders of other Opposition parties. Unfortunately, instead of appreciating my efforts and concern for the people of Gujarat and the tributes that the PM paid to the LoP of the Congress, the party leadership was extremely unhappy and critical. They dubbed me a BJP man. This clearly shows that they have no empathy for human tragedy and cannot think beyond petty politics. This is further reinforced by the fact that none of these Congress leaders or my opponents quoted a single good word said by almost two dozen other political leaders. If they were honest, they should have quoted those as well. - Pranab Mukherjee takes voters for granted
There is also the burden of unfulfilled political promises, which creates a trust deficit that can ultimately lead to anti-incumbency. In the run-up to the 2004 Lok Sabha Elections, before the process of ticket distribution for West Bengal had begun, Pranab da met me and expressed a desire to contest the elections, saying that he had spent enough time in the Rajya Sabha. He had identified a constituency—Jangipur—that had a 70 per cent Muslim population. He said that he would seek a ticket from there if I promised to campaign for him for four–five days. I told him that being the general secretary in charge, my campaign schedule for undivided Andhra Pradesh had been already drawn up and I might not be able to give him time in case the dates for both Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal clashed. Luckily for him, it did not, and I campaigned in his constituency for four full days and addressed about 25 public meetings. Pranab da won, though with just around a margin of over 36,000 votes.
In the 2009 elections, he repeated the request. He was already a Union Cabinet minister. This time, I played another ‘card’ with the poor innocent voters. I told them that it would be a shame for me if a senior minister like Pranab da failed to win by a large margin despite my campaigning and my travel all the way from Kashmir to a Muslim-dominated constituency. I also told them that Pranab da had promised that in the next election from the constituency, a Muslim candidate from the Congress party would contest. That appeal clicked, and Pranab da won with a handsome margin of more than 128,000 votes.
Five years later, in the 2014 Lok Sabha election, I was under the impression that Pranab da would keep his word and back a Muslim candidate from the constituency. But unfortunately, that did not happen. During the campaigning, I was attending a WHO meeting in Geneva as the country’s health minister. Pranab da, who was the president by then, called and told me that his son Abhijit would be contesting from that constituency. With only two days left for campaigning to end, he urged me to campaign for Abhijit. I was shocked. I told him that I would not be able to make it in time from Geneva. But he insisted, saying, ‘Do it for me.’
It was difficult for me to face the people, yet, I agreed. I took the earliest flight from Geneva to London and the next flight to Delhi, and headed straight to Kolkata. From there, I took a night train to the constituency. I had already contacted some senior leaders there. I reached early in the day and held seven or eight meetings on the last day of campaigning. I apologized to the people for having failed to get a Muslim contestant. Abhijit won, but it wasn’t long before the spectre of unfulfilled promises came to haunt him. Having taken the voters for granted by repeating a candidate from outside who had done precious little for the voters and the region, the Congress lost the 2019 Lok Sabha Elections to the TMC. - Meeting Karunanidhi
Thangkabalu also suggested that I invite M. Karunanidhi to attend the function; the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) leader was in the opposite camp in those days. Thangkabalu knew Karunanidhi quite well, so he immediately arranged a meeting with the supreme leader of the DMK the very next day. That was my first interaction with the DMK chief; I was impressed by his love and affection as well as the warmth with which he treated me. He promised to attend the conference in spite of being opposed to Indira ji. He also told me that should I need any help, it would be provided without delay. During my meeting with him, Thangkabalu was with me and was privy to this discussion.
After being with Karunanidhi for almost more than 45 minutes, I very politely asked him if I could bring Sanjay to meet him since he would also be attending this convention a fortnight later. He immediately said, ‘Yes, why not!’ He added, ‘My fight is with Indira Gandhi, not with you boys.’ Karunanidhi not only attended but also addressed the convention. - Losing Telangana
The other mess that the party made was in undivided Andhra Pradesh. It read too much into the noise that a handful of MPs from the Telangana region made in Parliament, especially in the Rajya Sabha, when they demanded a separate state. Leaders, including me, realized later that these MPs did not have the kind of popular support they claimed to have.
Congress leaders in Andhra, on the other hand, were ambiguous, barring CM Kiran Kumar Reddy, who made his opposition clear. When the party asked its MPs and MLAs from the Andhra region for their opinion, they said they would go by the high command’s decision. However, once the bifurcation was announced, those very Andhra MPs and MLAs rose in opposition, claiming that they hadnot expected the Union government and the Congress party’s high command to accept the division! That is why they did not oppose the division; moreover, they did not want to antagonize the people of Telangana. This was such a silly argument. The fact is that they had remained silent because they had business interests in Hyderabad and nearby places, and so did not want to antagonize the Telangana leaders by openly opposing the demand for a Telangana state.
Once the bifurcation was endorsed by the Union Cabinet, Congress leaders of Telangana should have seized the opportunity by going to the people to tell them that the party had given them a new state. There was a six-month gap between the CWC and the Cabinet decision, during which Congress leaders and ministers from Telangana stayed in Delhi instead of being among their constituents. They were furiously lobbying for the CM’s post of the state to be formed. Though I was not in charge of the state, I called all the senior ministers and leaders of Telangana to my residence on two occasions and impressed upon them that instead of wasting their time, they should tour the entire state, both individually and collectively, and take credit for the creation of the new state. Unfortunately, they did not heed my advice, maybe because I was not the general secretary in charge and could not hurt them in anyway politically. K. Chandrasekhar Rao, on the other hand, took advantage of the absence of Congress leaders in the field and went from village to village pretending to be the champion of the state formation. From there on, the Congress has been going from bad to worse.